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https://doi.org/10.1002/hup.2617Objective: The aim of this study was to investigate the following: (a) the effects of acute alco-
hol on delay discounting; (b) the effects of drinking status on delayed discounting; and (c) whether
these effects differ according to reward type (alcohol vs. money).
Methods: Heavy and light social alcohol users (n = 96) were randomized to receive either an
acute dose of alcohol at 0.4 or 0.6 g/kg or placebo in a between‐subjects, double‐blind design.
Delay discounting of alcohol and monetary rewards was measured using a hyperbolic model, with
higher scores indicative of greater delay discounting.
Results: ANOVA of discount scores indicated a main effect of reward type, where all partici-
pants had higher discount scores for alcohol versus money rewards. A main effect of drinking sta-
tus was also observed, where heavier drinkers had higher discount scores compared with lighter
drinkers. We did not observe a main effect of acute alcohol use on delay discounting or the
hypothesized interactions between acute alcohol use and drinking status with reward type.
Conclusions: Our data suggest that heavier drinkers discount the value of delayed rewards
more steeply than lighter drinkers. Delay discounting may therefore be a promising marker of
heavy alcohol consumption in social drinkers.
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Delay discounting is defined as the impulsive choice of smaller, immediate
rewards over larger, delayed rewards (Rachlin & Green, 1972). Delay
discounting tasks assess the extent to which decision‐making is insensitive
to longer‐term consequences and rewards, with participants making a
choice between receiving a smaller immediate reward or a larger delayed
reward. In the case of alcohol, impulsive choice may reflect choosing a
lesser, immediate reward (e.g., intoxication and euphoria), over a larger,
delayed reward (e.g., good health). Laboratory studies examining the
acute effects of alcohol on delay discounting have produced mixed find-
ings. Studies in both human and rodents report that moderate to high
doses of alcohol (0.25–0.8 g/kg) have no effect on delay discounting
(Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999, Wilhelm & Mitchell, 2012,
Bidwell et al., 2013, Wray, Simons, & Maisto, 2015). In contrast,
other studies have shown a trend for reduced (Ortner, MacDonald, &- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
: Clinical and Experimental PublishOlmstead, 2003) and increased delay discounting following high dose
of alcohol (0.7–0.8 g/kg; Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).
Another line of research has indicated that alcohol dependent and
heavy social drinkers discount the value ofmonetary rewardsmore steeply
than lighter drinkers (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998, Petry, 2001a, Mitchell,
Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005, Field, Christiansen, Cole, & Goudie,
2007). Additionally, alcohol dependent and social drinkers discount alcohol
rewards more steeply than monetary rewards (Petry, 2001b; Odum &
Rainaud, 2003). Steeper delay discounting for drug‐related rewards has
been demonstrated across a range of substances (e.g., marijuana,
cigarettes, and alcohol; Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003, Mitchell, 2004,
Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007, Johnson et al., 2010). A preference
for smaller immediate, drug‐related rewards compared with monetary
rewards has two possible theoretical explanations (Odum & Rainaud,
2003). Firstly, a preference for immediate drug rewards may reflect
the perishable nature of drugs and the longer lasting appeal of money- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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with money). Secondly, drug rewards are primary reinforcers that have a
direct effect on behavior (e.g., intoxication, relaxation), making them valu-
able as immediate rewards. In contrast, monetary rewards are reinforcers
that must be exchanged for other goods in order to impact behavior.
To our knowledge, no studies have examined the effects of acute
alcohol use and heaviness of drinking on delay discounting of alcohol
versus monetary rewards. Such a study has the potential to inform a
growing body of research investigating impulsivity as a potential
marker for heavy alcohol use. In this study, we examined the influence
of heaviness of drinking, alcohol intoxication, and reward type on delay
discounting. We examined the effects of two doses of alcohol on delay
discounting of alcohol and monetary rewards in light and heavy social
drinkers. Both moderate (0.4 g/kg) and high (0.6 g/kg) doses of alcohol
were included to assess the extent to which delay discounting of
rewards may be differentially sensitive to different priming doses.
Additionally, light and heavy drinkers were included to examine the
influence of heaviness of drinking on delay discounting. Delay
discounting was assessed with a hypothetical, question‐based mea-
sure, given that an experiential paradigm with actual alcohol rewards
in this study (e.g., 10 pints of beer or 10 glasses of wine in one single
session) would have been unethical (Field et al., 2007). We hypothe-
sized that participants primed with an acute dose of alcohol compared
with those given a placebo drink would exhibit increased delay
discounting of alcohol‐related rewards, relative to monetary rewards.
Additionally, we hypothesized that heavier social drinkers compared
to lighter drinkers would exhibit increased delay discounting of alco-
hol‐related rewards, relative to monetary rewards.2 | METHODS
2.1 | Design
The study employed a double‐blind, placebo‐controlled design, com-
prising two between‐subjects factors of challenge condition (0.0, 0.4,
0.6 g/kg alcohol) and drinking status (light drinkers, heavy drinkers)
and a within‐subjects factor of reward type (alcohol, money).
2.2 | Participants
Social drinkers were recruited from students and staff at the University of
Bristol. Participants were assigned to drinking status groups based upon
number of alcohol units consumed per week and according to the UK
Department of Health recommended weekly guidelines at the time of
testing (2010). Light drinkers were defined as individuals who consume
≥l0 and ≤20 units of alcohol per week for males and ≥5 and ≤14 units of
alcohol per week for females. Heavy drinkers were defined as individuals
whoconsume≥21and≤50units perweek formales and≥15and≤35units
per week for females (where 1 unit is equivalent to 8 g of ethanol). Partic-
ipants received £7 each for participation. The study was approved by the
Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol.
2.3 | Materials
The delay discounting procedure was an experimenter‐delivered task
adapted from Moore and Cusens (2010). This task provides an ordinalindex of participants' discount function using 12‐choice items. For
each item, participants were asked “Would you prefer £10 now or £a
in 3 months time?”, where only £a varied and items were arranged so
that responses would titrate to a participant's approximate 3‐month
hyperbolic discount rate (i.e., value = a/[1 + kD], where a is the imme-
diate value of the reward, D is the delay duration, and k is the rate of
discount) expressed along an ordinal scale. The main outcome was a
calculated discount score. The lowest possible score was “1 for a 3‐
month discount rate of 25% and the highest was 13 for a 3‐month dis-
count rate of 99.9%” (Moore & Cusens, 2010, page 2). Higher discount
scores are indicative of greater discounting of delayed rewards. All
rewards were hypothetical, but participants were instructed to make
their choices as if they were going to actually receive the rewards that
they selected. Participants were instructed that one unit of alcohol was
equal to £1, which was consistent with the price per unit at the time of
testing. Alcohol rewards were matched to roughly equivalent mone-
tary rewards; £20 was equivalent to 10 pints of beer or 10 (175 ml)
glasses of wine. We fixed the maximum amount of alcohol offered at
an amount that could be plausibly consumed in one single drinking ses-
sion (e.g., 10 pints of beer or 10,175 ml glasses of wine).
Questionnaire measures included self‐report measures of drinking
behavior (Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; Bohn, Babor, &
Kranzler, 1995), impulsivity (Barratt Impulsivity Scale; Patton, Stanford,
& Barratt, 1995), sensation seeking (Impulsive Sensation Seeking;
Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993), mood (Profile of
Mood States [POMS]; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1992), and craving
(visual analogue scale [VAS]). The VAS comprised five items “I would like
to consume an alcoholic beverage”, “A drink would be very satisfying,”
“The thought of consuming an alcoholic beverage is appealing,” “I need
to have a drink,” and “I do not want to consume an alcoholic beverage.”
Each item was rated on an 80‐mm scale from “Not at all” to “Extremely.”2.4 | Procedure
All participants were tested between noon and 6 pm in a laboratory in
the School of Experimental Psychology at the University of Bristol. On the
test day, after providing informed consent, all participants completed a
screening process to exclude current use of medication and illicit sub-
stances, family history of alcoholism, and recent alcohol consumption
(i.e., within 12 hr of test session, verified by exhaled breath alcohol). Partic-
ipants were required to regularly consume wine or beer as these were the
alcohol‐related rewards offered in the delay discounting tasks and (units
per week) were recorded to establish allocation to drinking status group
(light drinkers, heavy drinkers). Weight was recorded for drink preparation.
Following the completion of baseline measures (Alcohol Use Disorders
Identification Test, Barratt Impulsivity Scale, Impulsive Sensation Seeking,
POMS, and VAS), participants were given 10 min to consume the drink.
Participants were randomly allocated to receive either an alcoholic
(0.4, 0.6 g/kg) or a placebo drink. For a 60‐kg adult, the 0.4‐g/kg dose
is approximately equivalent to 2 units of alcohol and the 0.6‐g/kg dose
to 3 units. The alcohol administration procedure was identical to that
described previously (Adams, Ataya, Attwood, & Munafo, 2013). Fol-
lowing drink consumption, participants completed the first awareness
check to determine whether they were aware if they had received
alcohol or placebo. Awareness of the alcohol content of the challenge
ADAMS ET AL. 3 of 6condition was determined by asking participants whether they
believed that their drink contained alcohol or not.
Next participants were given 15‐min absorption time, to ensure all
participants had an equivalent period between challenge administration
and the delay discounting task. During this period, participants com-
pleted postchallenge measures (POMS, VAS). At the end of this time,
participants completed the delay discounting taskwithmoney and alco-
hol reward order counterbalanced across participants. The task lasted
approximately 5 min. Following the task, participants completed the
POMS and VAS measures again and a second awareness check.
On completion of the study procedure, participants were informed
of their drink condition (verified by exhaled breath alcohol) and were
reimbursed and provided with a full debrief.2.5 | Statistical analysis
All analyses included two between‐subject factors of challenge condi-
tion (0.0, 0.4, 0.6 g/kg) and drinking status (light drinkers, heavy
drinkers). For the delay discounting task, a mixed‐model ANOVA of dis-
count scoreswas conducted including awithin‐subjects factor of reward
type (alcohol, money). Skewness tests for normality indicated that dis-
count data were nonnormal but could be corrected by a log transforma-
tion, using log10. For mood and alcohol craving data, mixed‐model
ANOVAs of POMS and VAS scores were conducted with an additional
within‐subjects factor of time (baseline, postchallenge, posttasks).
Bivariate correlationswere conductedof delay discounting scores (alco-
hol,money)withVAScraving scores (baseline, postchallenge, posttasks).
A post hoc sensitivity analysis indicated that the study had 80% statistical
power at an alpha level of 5% to detect an effect size of f = 0.16 for the
interaction effect of challenge condition (0.0, 0.4, and 0.6 g/kg alcohol)
on reward type (alcohol, money). The data that form the basis of the results
presented here are available from the data.bris Research Data Repository
(http:/data.bris.ac.uk/data/) doi: 10.5523/bris.j2fzlhxc2or234cki8igwtzr.3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Characteristics of participants
Participants (n = 96; 51% male) were, on average, aged 24 years
(SD = 4, range 18–39). Table 1 shows characteristics of light andTABLE 1 Characteristics of participants
Alcohol (0.0 g/kg) N = 32 A
Light n = 16 Heavy n = 16 Light
Age (years) 23 (4) 24 (4) 22
Alcohol (units/week) 11 (5) 26 (11) 12
Weight (kg) 68 (14) 69 (11) 65
BIS 78 (5) 78 (5) 80
ImpSS 11 (3) 14 (3) 12
AUDIT 11 (5) 13 (5) 10
Delay score (alcohol) 4 (3) 3 (3) 5
Delay score (money) 2 (1) 3 (2) 3
Note. Values are expressed as mean (standard deviation). Delay discounting dat
Note. AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; BIS = Barratt Impulsivheavy drinking participants allocated to challenge conditions. Alloca-
tion of light and heavy drinking participants was equally spilt across
0.0 and 0.6 g/kg conditions, with one participant in the 0.4 g/kg
miscategorised as a heavy drinker at data collection, which was
corrected during data analysis. Exhaled breath alcohol level (BrAL)
was 0.00 μg/L at baseline for all participants. At the end of testing,
average BrAL was 0.00 μg/L in the placebo (0.00 g/kg alcohol)
condition, 0.15 μg/L in the 0.4 g/kg alcohol condition, and
0.25 μg/L in the 0.6 g/kg alcohol condition. At the end of testing,
BrAL did not differ between light and heavy drinkers (p = .32,
η2 = 0.01).3.2 | Delay discounting task
A mixed‐model ANOVA of transformed discount scores indicated a
main effect of reward type (F [1, 90] = 23.94, p < .001, η2 = 0.21),
reflecting higher overall discount scores for alcohol (M = 0.5, SD = 0.3)
compared with money (M = 0.3, SD = 0.2) rewards. There was also evi-
dence of a main effect of drinking status (F [1, 90] = 4.85, p = .030,
η2 = 0.05), with higher discount scores among heavier (M = 0.5,
SD = 0.3) compared with lighter (M = 0.4, SD = 0.3) drinkers. These data
are represented graphically in Figure 1. There was no clear evidence of
any other main effects or interactions (ps > .20).3.3 | Correlations
Pearson correlation coefficients of money and alcohol discount scores
with alcohol craving at baseline, postchallenge, and posttasks did not
indicate any clear evidence of association between delay discounting
and alcohol craving (rs < .06, ps > .55).3.4 | Awareness check
Awareness checks were performed immediately following drink con-
sumption (time 1) and at the end of testing (time 2). At time 1, 47%
of participants in the 0.00 g/kg condition, 97% of participants in the
0.4 g/kg condition, and 100% of participants in the 0.6 g/kg condition
reported that their drink contained alcohol. At time 2, these figures
were 35% in the 0.0 g/kg condition, 97% in the 0.4 g/kg condition,
and 100% in the 0.6 g/kg condition.lcohol (0.4 g/kg) N = 32 Alcohol (0.6 g/kg) N = 32
n = 17 Heavy n = 15 Light n = 16 Heavy n = 16
(4) 26 (5) 24 (5) 22 (4)
(4) 25 (6) 12 (5) 25 (9)
(8) 68 (10) 69 (12) 68 (8)
(7) 78 (7) 81 (5) 78 (6)
(3) 12 (3) 11 (3) 12 (3)
(4) 15 (4) 10 (5) 14 (6)
(4) 6 (3) 4 (3) 5 (3)
(2) 3 (2) 2 (2) 3 (2)
a are untransformed.
ity Scale; ImpSS = Impulsive Sensation Seeking.
FIGURE 1 Delay discounting scores by drinking status groups and
challenge condition. Discounting scores for alcohol versus money
rewards by challenge condition for (a) Lighter drinkers and (b) Heavier
drinkers. Values are mean ± SE. Larger values indicate greater
discounting of delayed reward. Data are untransformed
4 of 6 ADAMS ET AL.3.5 | Craving and mood
A mixed‐model ANOVA of craving scores indicated evidence of a main
effect of time (F [1, 180] = 4.08, p = .021, η2 = 0.04), reflecting a linear
increase in craving from baseline (M = 16, SD = 7, Range = 1–33) to
postchallenge (M = 18, SD = 13, Range = 1–98) to posttasks (M = 18,
SD = 9, Range = 1–49). There was no clear evidence of any other main
effects or interactions (ps > .14).
A mixed‐model ANOVA of mood scores indicated a main effect
of time for depression, fatigue, tension, and vigor (ps < .01), such
that depression, tension, and fatigue decreased linearly across time,
while vigor increased from baseline to postchallenge but decreased
from postchallenge to posttasks. The main effect of depression
was qualified by an interaction between time × challenge condition.
Simple effects analyses of time were conducted for participants in
the 0.0, 0.4, and 0.6 g/kg conditions separately. There was evidence
of a main effect of time for participants in 0.6 g/kg condition only (F
[2, 56] = 13.77, p < .001, η2 = 0.33), such that there was a linear
decrease in depression from baseline to postchallenge to posttasks.
An interaction between drinking status × challenge condition was
observed for confusion (F [2, 84] = 2.82, p = .065, η2 = 0.06). Simple
effects analyses of time were conducted for participants in the 0.0,
0.4, and 0.6 g/kg conditions separately. There was evidence of a
main effect of drinking status for participants in 0.6 g/kg condition
only (F [1, 27] = 6.87, p = .014, η2 = 0.20), such that heavier
drinkers had higher confusion scores, compared to lighter drinkers.
There was no evidence for any other main effects or interactions
(ps > .11).4 | DISCUSSION
Our data suggest that heavier drinkers show greater discounting of
delayed rewards relative to lighter drinkers, irrespective of reward
type. Additionally, we observed a main effect of reward type, such that
all drinkers (in the range examined) showed greater impulsive decision‐
making towards alcohol rewards compared with money rewards. Con-
trary to our hypotheses, our data did not indicate any interaction
effects of acute alcohol consumption or drinking status on delayed
discounting of alcohol versus money rewards.
Consistent with previous research (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998,
Petry, 2001a, Field et al., 2007), we observed that heavier social
drinkers showed steeper delay discounting than lighter drinkers, indic-
ative of greater impulsive decision‐making. However, we did not
observe that steeper delay discounting of alcohol versus money
rewards was specific to heavier drinking participants, in contrast to
previous research (Petry 2001). This discrepancy may reflect differ-
ences in the types of drinkers examined, where Petry (2001b) studied
alcohol‐dependent drinkers. Our delay discounting data show substan-
tial variation in discounting response in heavier social drinkers, sug-
gesting our sample included a wide range of heavy drinkers (e.g.,
heavy occasional use to problem drinking). Our results add to a grow-
ing body of research indicating that heavier drinkers have a general dif-
ficulty in delaying gratification, which may reflect an underlying
propensity for greater impulsivity. These findings have implications
for reducing alcohol intake by increasing sensitivity to longer‐term
rewards (e.g., improved health, social benefits) and the consequences
of heavy alcohol use (e.g., the monetary cost of alcohol, the effects
of heavy alcohol use on health). Looking ahead, recent research has
demonstrated the potential of interventions targeted at reducing
impulsive decision‐making in smokers and stimulant drug‐dependent
individuals (Bickel, Yi, Landes, Hill, & Baxter, 2011, Hofmeyr, Ainslie,
Charlton, & Ross, 2011).
Our findings also suggest that social drinkers (in the range exam-
ined) show greater discounting of alcohol versus money rewards.
This finding is consistent with previous research (Odum & Rainaud,
2003), suggesting that delay discounting is more pronounced when
making a decision concerning alcohol versus money rewards. Our
results therefore add to a growing body of research demonstrating
steeper discounting of alcohol versus money rewards. Steeper
discounting of alcohol rewards may reflect a general process associ-
ated with consumable rewards (i.e., alcohol is more valued as an
immediate reward due to the fact it can be consumed immediately,
whereas money must be exchanged in order to obtain a reward).
Additionally, money may be more attractive as a delayed reward,
with no expiry.
Consistent with previous research (Richards et al., 1999, Bidwell
et al., 2013, Wray et al., 2015), our results suggest that moderate–
high doses of alcohol (in the 0.4 to 0.6 g/kg range) do not influence
delay discounting of money rewards. Our study is also the first to
examine the effects of acute alcohol on discounting of alcohol versus
money rewards, indicating no influence of alcohol intoxication on
impulsive decision‐making towards alcohol or money rewards. These
findings are in contrast to anecdotal reports (Graham, 1980) and pre-
vious research (Reynolds et al., 2006), which suggests that acute
ADAMS ET AL. 5 of 6alcohol increases delay discounting. In addition, our results contradict
previous reports of greater discounting of drug versus money
rewards during drug intoxication (Giordano et al., 2002, Mitchell,
2004). However, these conclusions are only valid if we accept that
delay discounting tasks themselves are sensitive to drug‐induced
state changes. Reynolds et al. (2006) suggest that experiential delay
discounting tasks are more sensitive to the effects of state changes
in impulsivity than question‐based measures, such as the one used
in this study. Nevertheless, a recent study (Wray et al., 2015) using
an experiential discounting task failed to show an effect of acute
alcohol use on delay discounting. Future work should seek to make
a direct comparison of different delay discounting tasks on state
changes in impulsive decision‐making. Additionally, future work
should also examine the reliability and validity of hypothetical mea-
sures of delay discounting. Inconsistent findings on the acute effects
of alcohol on impulsive behavior reflect the need for replication stud-
ies, to establish the role of delay discounting in alcohol‐related state
changes in impulsive behavior.
Limitations of our study include the use of hypothetical alcohol‐
related and money rewards. As we have noted, some researchers
have indicated that hypothetical tasks may be less sensitive to acute
changes in discounting (Reynolds et al., 2006). However, consistent
with previous research, the provision of actual alcohol rewards in
this study would have been unethical, given the amount of drinks
offered in a single session (Field et al., 2007). Additionally, our
between‐subjects design did not enable collection of baseline infor-
mation regarding the socioeconomic status of participants. A base-
line assessment of socioeconomic status would have enabled us to
control for any group differences in value of money rewards. A fur-
ther limitation of our between‐subjects design was the inability to
control for individual differences in impulsive behavior. However,
this design was selected to limit participants establishing a stable
pattern of responding across time on the delay discounting task
(Ortner et al., 2003).5 | CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our data indicate that heavier drinkers discount the
value of all delayed rewards more steeply than lighter drinkers. This
finding suggests that impulsive decision‐making is influenced by indi-
vidual differences in drinking patterns that is irrespective of reward
type. Additionally, we observed that all drinkers in the range examined
showed greater delay discounting of alcohol rewards, which may
reflect the nature of alcohol as a consumable reward. Our data did
not suggest any effects of acute alcohol on delay discounting; how-
ever, further research is required to establish how sensitive delay
discounting tasks are to state changes in alcohol consumption and to
determine the reliability and validity of hypothetical measures of delay
discounting. This study adds to a body of research suggesting that
impulsive delay discounting is a promising marker of heavy alcohol
consumption in social drinkers. Additionally, our data indicate a need
for research to explore the mechanism underlying the general trend
for steeper discounting of drug versus money rewards observed here
and in previous studies.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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